My research interests lie mainly in moral philosophy. I work on a variety of issues spanning across metaethics, normative ethics, and moral psychology. Topics of interest include: moral worth, praise and praising attitudes (e.g., esteem, pride), hypocrisy, the ethics of blame, the nature of friendship, friendship and moral theory, moral error theory, and moral naturalism.
Published and accepted papers
Naturalising Moral Naturalism
Forthcoming: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy Should Moral Error Theorists Make Do with Make-Believe?
Published: Moral Fictionalism and Religious Fictionalism (2023) (A collection of works edited by Richard Joyce and Stuart Brock) Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive
Published: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 105, 2: 276-298 (2022) Click here for a link to the published version |
Subjunctive Hypocrisy
Published: Ergo 9, 7: 172-199 (2022)
Click here for a link to the published version
Published: Ergo 9, 7: 172-199 (2022)
Click here for a link to the published version
Don't Stop Believing (Hold onto That Warm Fuzzy Feeling)
Published: Ethics 132: 4-37 (2021)
(Co-authored with Edward Elliott)
Click here for a link to the published version
Published: Ethics 132: 4-37 (2021)
(Co-authored with Edward Elliott)
Click here for a link to the published version
Moral Worth: Having it Both Ways
Published: The Journal of Philosophy 117: 529-556 (2020)
Click here for a link to the published version
Published: The Journal of Philosophy 117: 529-556 (2020)
Click here for a link to the published version
Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident
Published: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97: 251-264 (2019)
Click here for a link to the published version
Published: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97: 251-264 (2019)
Click here for a link to the published version
Evolutionary Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
Published: Erkenntnis 84: 1025–1045 (2019) Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for link to published version Minimizing the Misuse of Morality
Published: The End of Morality (Routledge 2019) (A collection of works edited by Richard Joyce and Richard Garner) Click here for the penultimate draft |
On Having Bad Persons as Friends
Published: Philosophical Studies 175: 3099-3116 (2018)
Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for a link to the published version
Published: Philosophical Studies 175: 3099-3116 (2018)
Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for a link to the published version
Hypocrisy and Moral Authority
Published: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12: 191-222 (2017)
(Co-authored with Colin Klein)
Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for a link to the published version
Published: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12: 191-222 (2017)
(Co-authored with Colin Klein)
Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for a link to the published version
book reviews & encyclopedia entries
Moral Hypocrisy
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online
(Encyclopedia entry)
Click here for a link to the online entry
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online
(Encyclopedia entry)
Click here for a link to the online entry
Richard Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism
Published: Utilitas 32, 126-129 (2020)
(Book review)
Click here for a link to the online paper
Published: Utilitas 32, 126-129 (2020)
(Book review)
Click here for a link to the online paper
Empathy and Morality
Published: Biology & Philosophy 30: 597-608 (2015)
(Book review)
Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for a link to the published version
Published: Biology & Philosophy 30: 597-608 (2015)
(Book review)
Click here for the penultimate draft | Click here for a link to the published version
papers Under review
Below are descriptions of work under review.
Please feel free to e-mail me for a copy of any of these papers.
Please feel free to e-mail me for a copy of any of these papers.
Friendship and moral theory
This paper explores the relationship between moral duties and duties of friendship.
An Investigation into Pride
This paper explores the emotion of pride. I aim to develop an account of pride that can help us to distinguish it from other phenomena in the emotional neighbourhood, such as happiness, admiration, and esteem.
Analytic Moral Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth (co-authored with Edward Elliott)
This paper develops a response to the well-known 'Moral Twin Earth' challenge on behalf of the analytic moral naturalist.
This paper explores the relationship between moral duties and duties of friendship.
An Investigation into Pride
This paper explores the emotion of pride. I aim to develop an account of pride that can help us to distinguish it from other phenomena in the emotional neighbourhood, such as happiness, admiration, and esteem.
Analytic Moral Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth (co-authored with Edward Elliott)
This paper develops a response to the well-known 'Moral Twin Earth' challenge on behalf of the analytic moral naturalist.
work IN PROgRESS
Below are descriptions of works in progress.
These are still being translated from Mentalese to English, so I don't have drafts to share just yet--happy to discuss, though!
These are still being translated from Mentalese to English, so I don't have drafts to share just yet--happy to discuss, though!
Holding people's pasts against them
This paper explores the phenomenon of holding people's pasts against them, and questions whether we are always justified in doing so. It also develops and defends a particular approach for thinking about moral redemption.
Blame's Blind Spot
This paper argues on the basis of empirical evidence that we systematically fail to satisfy two important norms of ethical blaming: (1) an epistemic norm requiring that a blamer’s conviction in a blamee’s blameworthiness satisfy certain epistemic standards, and (2) a proportionality norm requiring that a blamer’s blame be proportionate to a blamee’s blameworthiness.
Schmoralising and Moral Error Theory
This paper offers a critique of Blackburn's well-known 'schmoralising' argument against moral error theory, and seeks to develop a distinct schmoralising argument that overcomes the shortcomings of Blackburn's.
This paper explores the phenomenon of holding people's pasts against them, and questions whether we are always justified in doing so. It also develops and defends a particular approach for thinking about moral redemption.
Blame's Blind Spot
This paper argues on the basis of empirical evidence that we systematically fail to satisfy two important norms of ethical blaming: (1) an epistemic norm requiring that a blamer’s conviction in a blamee’s blameworthiness satisfy certain epistemic standards, and (2) a proportionality norm requiring that a blamer’s blame be proportionate to a blamee’s blameworthiness.
Schmoralising and Moral Error Theory
This paper offers a critique of Blackburn's well-known 'schmoralising' argument against moral error theory, and seeks to develop a distinct schmoralising argument that overcomes the shortcomings of Blackburn's.